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This study investigates the connection between the duration of financial
contracts and that of labour contracts. Workers with long-term contracts
have incentives to invest in training. This makes them attractive to the
entrepreneur. Furthermore, this behaviour will be reinforced if financial
contracts are long-term, because it reduces the probability of an early
liquidation as well as the dismissal of trained workers. As a conclusion,
significant increases in the length of financing contracts should be accom-
panied by corresponding increases in the length of labour contracts.
Support for this theoretical contention is found by testing it on a dataset
composed of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1991–2000.
I. Introduction
A firm’s efficiency is very much related to its ability
to manage optimality its resources (intangible, finan-
cial, and physical) that are obtained through different
types of contracts (labour and financial among
others). To achieve this aim, a firm tries to coordinate
these resources closely by complementing the char-
acteristics of the contracts that govern their supply.
This study focuses on the length of contracts and the
scope is restricted to financial and labour contracting.
Labour contracts are those through which workers
provide human capital to firms, while financial
contracts give firms access to financial resources.
Our conjecture is that the length of both contracts is
closely related, and variations in the length of one
contract are translated into variations in the length
of the other.
Traditionally, there is a trade-off to find the opti-
mal length for labour contracts. This is so as to bal-
ance the cost of negotiating different short-term
contracts with the lack of flexibility of long-term con-
tracts in an uncertain environment (Gray, 1978; Dye,
1985). The higher the uncertainty, the more attractive
are short-term contracts (Murphy, 2000). Within this
setting, there are different factors that play a role in
the previous balance. First, the commitment effect
linked to long-term labour contracts favours a
firm’s specific investments like those that accompany
long-term labour contracting. Second, the short-
sightnesss of shareholders may induce managers to
adopt short-term investment policies. Third, the
lack of flexibility of long-term labour contracts acts
like a ‘poison pill’ to deter potential raiders (Pagano
and Volpin, 2002). However, these contracts gener-
ally involve superior investment levels as well as
lower levels of disposable cash flow for managers,
which in turn, improve a firm’s value (Del Brio
et al., 2003). This would make these firms with
long-term labour contracts more attractive as take
over targets. Lastly, the presence of intermediaries
such as unions may favour short-term contracts as
a way of maintaining their bargaining power within
the firm (Hendricks and Kahn, 1983; Murphy, 1992)
or long-term contracts (Ba´rcena and Campo, 2000).
Also, Ayala et al. (2002), making use of a sample
of OECD countries, finds that collective bargaining
co-ordination, which is more feasible in the presence
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of unions, reduces the unemployment rate and with
that the replacement rate. This makes labour con-
tracts more long-term in their nature. This factor is
important in Spain because, as the former authors
show, collective bargaining covers 68% of the
Spanish labour force.
Interestingly, a firms financing resources affect the
previous balance of factors. Long-term capital repre-
sents a financier’s commitment that allows the firm
more flexibility in facing uncertainty. In addition, the
greater the financier’s commitment, the more willing
a firm is to make specific investment (i.e. in human
capital). Consequently, workers with long-term con-
tracts are more attractive. Thus, it seems natural that
variations in a characteristic of financial contracts,
like their length, should have and impact on the
length of labour contracts.
This is not the first study to examine the inter-
actions between labour and financial relationships.
Some authors have already studied both contracts
jointly although addressing a different question to
ours. Garvey and Swan (1992), shows that debt-
financed firms’ workers are more cooperative than
those from equity-financed firms. Osano (1997)
proves, using an evolutive model, that a financial
contract that prevents the liquidation of a project at
an early stage of development (long-term debt), is
more efficient when complemented with a labour con-
tract that motivates workers to make some efforts.
Tsouhoulas (1999) shows that debt contracts can
only survive when workers can commit in advance
not to renegotiate their labour contracts with the
firm, (i.e. workers with few options outside those
who are hired with short-term labour contracts).
Along these lines, Hanka (1998) makes an empirical
study for the USA and concludes that: the more
indebted a firm, the more disciplined are its workers,
and the higher its proportion of temporal workers.
Finally, Martin (2003) confirms indirectly Hanka
result by showing the diminishing commitment value
of firm’s specific capital in presence of debt. Although
he focuses on physical capital, the extension to
specific human capital (more linked to long-term
workers) in the presence of debt is straightforward.
This study goes a step further than Hanka, as it
distinguishes between long-term debt and short-term
debt. This is relevant because this will allow one to
focus on what is thought to be the real financing
determinant of labour contract length – the financial
contract length.
The first objective in this study is to present a
theoretical framework that it is formally developed
in Hernando and Tribo´ (2003) to justify the linkage
between the length of labour contracts and financial
contacts. The basic idea is that extended contract
length stimulates specific investments. Workers with
long-term contracts have incentives to increase their
human capital by making specific investments in
training (Becker, 1964). Moreover, this behaviour
will be reinforced when these workers perceive that
financiers are committed to the firm. A natural indi-
cator for this financier commitment is the length of
financial contracts, because it reduces the probability
of an early liquidation. Furthermore, workers by
making these efforts make financiers’ returns more
likely and, lenders will stimulate this process by pro-
viding long-term capital, which makes long-term
labour contracts even more attractive. As a conclu-
sion, significant increases in the length of financing
contracts should be accompanied by similar increases
in the length of labour contracts. This is in line
with Ragan (1995), although he introduces risk
considerations to obtain a positive relationship
between firms’ bargaining power (higher for high-
length financial contracts), and the length of labour
contracts.
The second objective of this study is to conduct an
empirical analysis to test the main theoretical findings
on a data set composed of Spanish manufacturing
firms for the period 1991–2000. This is a quite rele-
vant period, as an important reform to stimulate
long-term labour contracting was implemented in
1997. Evidence is found that those firms that have
increased (decreased) significantly their financial con-
tract length, have also increased (decreased) their
labour contract length. Furthermore, it is also
observed that labour contract length is directly
related to the level of a firm’s R&D investments as
well as to its degree of diversification. In addition, it is
inversely related to increases in financing costs. This
latter result coincides with Rendo´n (2000) that shows,
using a database of Spanish manufacturing firms that
financially constrained firms hire more temporary
workers than permanent ones.
This article is organized as follows. Section II
presents the theoretical underpinnings. The meth-
odology to estimate is explained in Section III, and
the results are presented in Section IV. The article
concludes in Section V with some final remarks.
II. Theoretical Underpinnings
The main argument of the paper can be shown with a
very simple model.1 A firm undertakes a project that
1This model is formally developed in Hernando and Tribo´ (2003).
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lasts for two periods and seeks some financing. Once
the capital has been found, the firm has the possibility
of hiring workers offering them two types of con-
tracts: a short-term contract (one-period contract)
or a long-term contract (two-period contract).
Workers have the possibility to implement non-
verifiable effort, e, in the first period, which is firm
specific, in order to become more productive in the
second period. This will generate some additional
returns that are tangible, thus, allowing compensat-
ing the workers for that effort, e, produced in the
previous period. The point is that only workers
with a two-period contract (long-term contract) will
have incentives to implement this effort, e. Short-term
workers, since they have no assurance of being
employed in the second period, do not make any
effort.2 The intensity of this effort will be much
dependent on the probability of project liquidation,
P, at the end of the first period. The higher the P, the
lower workers’ willingness will be to implement effort
e, because after project liquidation there is no com-
pensation for first-period effort. The point is that this
probability P relies on, among other things, the
length of financial contracts that tie a firm to its
lenders.3 In addition, the higher this length, the
lower the P will be and, consequently, the higher
the workers’ incentives for effort e. Thus, within
this long-term financial contract scenario, the entre-
preneur will prefer to hire workers with long-term
contracts and exploit workers’ willingness to make
effort e.4 Moreover, by implementing this effort, the
payment to lenders is more likely and they will, in turn,
reinforce that workers’ behaviour by accepting long-
term lending to finance the initial project.5 The out-
come is a complementarity relationship between the
length of labour contracts and of financial contracts.
According to this simple model, it is expected
that borrowing significant new funds through
long-term (short-term) financial contracts should be
accompanied by recruiting a significantly higher
proportion of workers with long-term (short-term)
labour contracts. This is the main hypothesis to
contrast.
Under the resource-based view of the firm that is
adopted, the financing effect described above related
to the optimal definition of labour contract length,
competes with the effects of other resources of the
firm. In particular, and following (Wernerfelt, 1984;
Barney, 1991), one can mention:
. Financing resources: Cost of debt is inversely
related to lenders’ commitment to a firm. Its
reduction, according to the aforementioned
arguments, should promote long-term labour
contracting by stimulating human capital invest-
ment. In addition, the higher the cost of debt, the
more likely the entrepreneur is to hire workers
with a short-term contract because their costs
are lower in real terms (Sa´nchez and Toharia,
2000).
. Physical resources: Project type. It is understood
that for high-quality projects (especially if they
are long-term), increases in workers’ productiv-
ity as a result of human capital investment
generate more returns than for low-quality
ones. This will also promote long-term labour
contracting.
. Human Capital resources:Workers’ productivity.
Those workers with the potential to increase
substantially their productivity with a specific
training effort will give entrepreneurs incentives
to offer them long-length contracts. Becker (1964)
shows that long tenure is associated with
productivity-enhancing specific human capital.
It is argued that this should be especially true
in those firms that invest intensively in R&D,
as that kind of investment improves the returns
from human capital investment. Llorca (2002)
finds, using a sample of Spanish firms, a very
significant positive relationship between R&D
investment and worker’s productivity, especially
when this investment is in process innovation.
To synthesize, it can be stated that an entre-
preneur’s willingness to hire long-term workers
is greater given three scenarios.
. First, when the lender’s commitment to the firm
is high (long-term and/or low-cost lending);
. Second, when projects are high quality and
long-term. Generally, R&D-intensive projects
satisfy these conditions;
. Finally, when workers’ productivity is high.
2An alternative approach would have been to introduce the possibility to extend short-term workers’ contracts if their efforts,
e, are high enough. The problem is that this arrangement is contingent on e, which is not verifiable and only produces some
tangible results at the end of the second period.
3Questions of renegotiation can be ruled out at this point.
4Topel (1986) describes a long-term contract as a bond between the worker and the firm. This gives log-term workers
incentives to implement specific human capital investment.
5The firm is competing in a perfect competitive market and it is a contract taker.
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III. Methodology
A firm’s variation in its labour contract length is esti-
mated by considering a set of its internal resources
as well as some other factors. The temporal labour
ratio (defined as the ratio of temporal workers to
total workers) is used as a proxy inversely related to
a firm’s labour contract length. From the previous
arguments (a new project financing scenario where
a firm hires workers), those situations are highlighted
with a significant variation in that ratio. There are
two possibilities: Firms that hire the majority of
workers with short-term contracts (raises the
temporal labour ratio), and others that make use of
long-term contracts (decreases the temporal labour
ratio). Each alternative is characterized with two
different variables. ILR is a dummy variable, which
is equal to one when two conditions are met. First,
there is an increase in the temporal labour ratio,
which is higher than the median for the sector in
that year. Second, there is an increase in the number
of workers. The alternative variable, RILR (relative
increase in the labour ratio), is the continuous version
of ILR. Its value is zero when ILR¼ 0, and it is the
difference between the variation of a firm’s labour
ratio and the variation of that ratio for the correspond-
ing sector in that year, when ILR¼ 1. This variable
gives a more accurate measure of the relevant
increases in the length of a firm’s labour contracts.
For the decrease in the labour ratio, two alternative
variables are considered. DELR is a dummy variable
that is equal to one, when two other conditions are
met. First, there is a decrease in the temporal labour
ratio higher than themedian for the sector in that year.
Second, there is an increase in the number of workers.
The other variable, RDELR, is defined in terms of
DELR. Its value is zero when DELR¼ 0. It is the
absolute value of the difference between the variation
of a firm’s labour ratio and the variation of that ratio
for the corresponding sector in that year, when
DELR¼ 1. This ensures a positive-definite variable
that makes the interpretation of the results easier.
These variables are introduced advanced by one
period. This is to prevent possible endogeneity
problems with independent variables such as those
that characterize a firm’s productivity (see below).
To explain dummy variables, ILR and DLR, one
has to rely on logit estimations (Maddala, 1983). In
addition, for continuous but truncated variables,
RILR and RDELR, Tobit estimations are focused
on (Greene, 1993).
The basic specification takes into consideration
as main variables those that measure variations in
the length of financial contract. Additionally, the
study introduces as control variables the set of
resources that define a firm (Wernerfelt, 1984;
Barney, 1991) as well as other factors that are
traditionally considered to study the length of labour
contracts. These are firm’s size, uncertainty and risks.
In particular, the set of explanatory variables can be
grouped in the following way.
Main variables
There are two basic variables to test the main hypo-
thesis of the paper. Dummy variable IFR, is equal to
one when two conditions are met. First, there is an
increase in the debt-financing ratio (short-term debt
to total debt) higher than the median for the sector in
that year. Second, there is an increase in the total
debt. Alternatively, DEFR is a dummy variable
that it is equal to one when these conditions are
met. First, there is a decrease in the financing ratio
higher than the median for the sector in that year.
Second, there is an increase in the firm’s debt. The
idea is to highlight those situations where a firm is
engaged in project financing (there is an increase in
the total debt) and there is a significant change in the
length of a firm’s debt.
In those estimations using RILR and RDELR as
continuous dependent variables, one considers as
main variables those equivalents constructed with
the financing ratio. RIFR is zero when IFR¼ 0,
and it is the difference between the variation of a
firms financing ratio and the variation of the median
value of that ratio in the corresponding sector in that
year, when IFR¼ 1. However, RDEFR is defined in
terms of DEFR. Its value is zero when DEFR¼ 0. It
is the absolute value of the difference between the
variation of a firm’s financing ratio and the variation
of the median value of that ratio in the corresponding
sector in that year, when DEFR¼ 1. RIFR and
RDEFR variables show the magnitude of the varia-
tion of a firm’s financing ratio compared with their
counterparts in the same sector and for a given year.
In order not to introduce asymmetries with depen-
dent variables, these variables are also advanced by
one period. This may generate additional endogeneity
problems that are going to be treated in a specific
section below.
Consistent with the previous arguments in the
theoretical section, the previous variables are used
to focus on those situations where a firm undertakes
a project relevant enough to modify the ‘average
length’ of its outstanding contracts. This factor
would be reflected as a significant change in a firm’s
commitments (financial as well as labour). That is,
one only expects to find a linkage between a firm’s
financing and labour structure in those situations
involving relevant changes in both variables.
908 J. A. Tribo´
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In order to isolate the specific effect of variations in
the length of financial contracts from other effects
linked to other resources of the firm, the following
Control Variables are proposed.
Tangible resources (financing and physical)
DIFINCOST is the change in the firm’s bank
financing costs. This important variable reflects
different factors. First, it is a measure of a lender’s
commitment to a firm. A logical way to back the
firm’s activities is to ask for lower returns in exchange
for the capital lent. A second feature that reflects this
variable is project quality, the higher the quality, the
lower the cost of capital. Finally, uncertainty and
risk, in general, also increases the value of this
variable. Taking into account the above factors, one
expects a negative relationship between this variable
and increases in labour contract length.
To complement the previous variable, one uses
LTBANKDEBT, which is the ratio of long-term
bank debt to total bank debt. This is an alternative
measure of the financier’s commitment with the
firm (Sharpe, 1990). In addition, firms with such a
financial structure can afford long-term projects.
Finally, the variable LEVERAGE has also been
introduced, defined as the ratio of a firm’s debt to
internal funds. This variable will allow one to check
Hanka’s (1998) result for the relationship between
leverage and the hiring of temporal workers.
Intangible resources
A variable that accounts for workers’ productivity
(PRODUCTIVITY) is defined as a firm’s production
to the total number of workers.
RD is the ratio of R&D expenses to sales. This is
the classical measure of investment in intangibles. In
addition, this variable reflects the future expectations
of a firm’s returns. This will allow one to test whether
the relationship between labour and financial con-
tract length is spurious. That is, whether the under-
lying cause that links both lengths is the magnitude of
these expectations: The higher (lower) these expecta-
tions, the higher (lower) the length of both contracts.
Additional controls
SMALL is a dummy variable that it is equal to 1 (0)
if the firm has less (more) than 50 employees.
This variable controls for size effects. Along these
lines, Sharpe (1994) finds that changes in the work-
force along the cycle depend on a firm’s size.
DIVERSIFIC. This variable is defined as
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiPN
1¼1 S
2
i
q
where Si is a firm’s percentage of its sales in market i.
The more diversified a firm, the lower the value of this
variable. In addition, this variable can be connected
with a firm’s risk.
Thus, the logit specification we consider once
dependent variables ILR and DELR are used is as
follows:
TðILRÞ
TðDELRÞ
 
it
¼ 1IFRit þ 2DEFRit þ 3DIFINCOSTit
þ 4LTBANKDEBTit þ 5LEVERAGEit
þ 6PRODUCTIVITYit þ 7 RDit
þ 8 SMALLit þ 9DIVERSIFIC:it þ
i þ "it
0i þ "0it
 
ð1Þ
Where, TðILRÞ ¼ logðprobðILR ¼ 1Þ=1  prob
ðILR ¼ 1ÞÞ and TðDELRÞ ¼ logðprobðDELR ¼ 1Þ=
1  probðDELR ¼ 1ÞÞ i,0i accounts for the unob-
servable heterogeneity, and "i,"
0
i are white-noise
error terms.
Initially, both equations are estimated separately
(see Table 1). Then, one recognizes the possibility of
a joint determination of financing and labour ratio
(see below).
In addition, as aforementioned, Tobit estimations
(Green, 1993, p. 697) are conducted with dependent
variables RILR and RDELR.6 In this case, the latent
dependent variables follow this observability rule:
RILRit ¼
RILRit  VLRit MEDIANtðVLRÞ
if RILRit > 0, ILRit ¼ 1
0 Otherwise
8><
>:
9>=
>;
RDELRit ¼
MEDIANtðVLRÞ  VLRit
if RDELRit > 0, DELRit ¼ 1
0 Otherwise
8><
>:
9>=
>;
ð2Þ
where VLR is the variation between period tþ 1 and
period t of the labour ratio as it has been defined.
The median value of that ratio is taken with respect
to sector and year.
Note that both variables are not complementary
because of the condition ILRit ¼ 0 6¼ DELRit ¼ 1.
By construction, the importance of a firm’s
resources is recognized in explaining the definition
of its labour contracts length. However, one only
considers a set of these resources in the estimations.
This implies that those, which are not explicit in the
6By construction, half of the observations have a zero value for these variables.
An analysis of the length of labour and financial contracts 909
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variables used, are implicit under the unobservable
heterogeneity (i). The complementarity between
different firms resources imply that i is expected to
correlate with the aforementioned explanatory vari-
ables (fixed effects). Thus, one has to take advantage
of the conditional logit (Chamberlain, 1980) in the
estimation of ILR and DELR in order to eliminate
this unobservable heterogeneity and find consistent
estimators. The basic idea is to condition the
maximum likelihood function on the sum of the
different realizations of the dependent variable for
each individual (Greene, 1993, p. 656). The short-
coming of using logit estimations is that one has to
rely on dummy variables to measure changes in the
length of contracts. That is why Tobit estimations
have been conducted on variables RIFR and
RDEFR. However, these estimations do not control
for the potential endogeneity problem of the unobserv-
able heterogeneity.7
Once the previous estimations have been con-
ducted, one moves a step further to deal with the
problem of potential endogeneity between the defini-
tion of the length of financial contracts and of labour
contracts. This is precisely what has been argued in
the theoretical section. A standard way to deal with
this problem is by instrumenting the independent
variables making use of temporal lags.8 However,
this strategy does not work well either for truncated
variables (RIFR and RDEFR on Tobit estimation)
or for dummy variables (IFR and DEFR on logit
estimations). Thus, the way the problem is addressed
is by conducting a multinomial logit (Greene, 1993,
7Although dependent variables are clearly truncated, for completeness, regression estimations have been conducted control-
ling for fixed effects (available upon request). The results found are qualitatively the same as those obtained from Tobit
estimations. This is not surprising as Hausman Test on regressions of RDEF reveals the non-existence of the endogeneity
problem for the unobservable heterogeneity. See footnote 11
8This technique has been employed to tackle the potential endogeneity problem between variations of a firm’s labour ratio and
workers’ productivity. Dependent variables have been advanced by one period.
Table 1. Univariate estimations
DELRa,b RDELRa,c RDELRa,c ILRa,b RILRa,c RILRa,c
DEFR 0.301*** 0.326***
(3.000) (3.97)
IFR 0.090 0.357***
(0.980) (4.75)
RDEFR 0.081*** 0.025 0.034 0.027
(2.58) (0.61) (0.028) (0.76)
RIFR 0.034 0.108** 0.079*** 0.095***
(1.04) (2.67) (0.026) (3.42)
D97RDEFR 0.140*** 0.014
(2.35) (0.27)
D97RIFR 0.277*** 0.089
(4.13) (1.53)
DIFINCOSTS 0.018* 0.001** 0.001* 0.003 0 0
(1.660) (1.77) (1.58) (0.38) (0.058) (0.62)
LTBANKDEBT 0.135 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.082 0.004 0.005
(0.800) (3.85) (3.66) (0.61) (0.62) (0.73)
LEVERAGE 100 0.145 0.005 0.005 0.054 0.010 0.010
(0.750) (0.39) (0.35) (0.31) (0.86) (0.86)
PRODUCTIVITY 0*** 0 0 0*** 0*** 0***
(4.630) (1.30) (1.28) (6.48) (2.83) (2.85)
RD 0.305 0.209* 0.217** 1.253 0.052 0.054
(1.050) (1.73) (1.80) (0.56) (0.48) (0.49)
SMALL 0.146 0.006 0.006 1.149*** 0.006 0.006
(0.55) (1.00) (0.620) (4.31) (1.11) (1.10)
DIVERSIFIC. 0.009*** 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.004 0
(2.210) (1.42) (1.42) (1.27) (1.190) (0.57)
Number observ. 3658 7163 7163 5178 7163 7163
Log likelihood 1343.954 1447.217 1436.014 2027.102 1514.557 1513.33
LR ratio test 44.75 35.29 57.70 107.60 23.45 25.89
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.008) (0.008)
a***1% significant; **5% significant; *10% significant. P-values in parentheses. Variables defined in the text.
bConditional logit estimations.
cTobit estimations.
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p. 666) for the joint distribution of four dummy vari-
ables; those that characterize significant changes in
the length of labour contracts (ILR, DELR) and
those of financial contracts (IFR, DEFR). Variable
V encompasses all the events resulting from the com-
bination of the previous variables. By working with
the joint distribution of labour and financial vari-
ables, one can overcome the problem of endogeneity
that emerges from univariate specifications that
assume labour variables depend on financial vari-
ables. When the probabilities of events with labour
and financial content are computed, we can derive
marginal probabilities that move from financial to
labour structure. One considers as control variables
in the multinomial estimation those used in the pre-
vious univariate estimations. Specifically, variable V
is defined in the following table:
Variable
Definition ILR DELR IFR DEFR
V¼ 8 1 0 1 0
V¼ 7 1 0 0 1
V¼ 6 1 0 0 0
V¼ 5 0 1 0 1
V¼ 4 0 1 1 0
V¼ 3 0 1 0 0
V¼ 2 0 0 1 0
V¼ 1 0 0 0 1
V¼ 0 0 0 0 0
Thus, one focuses on a specification like the follow-
ing (Maddala, 1983, pp. 35):
TjðVÞit¼ 1jDIFINCOSTitþ2jLTBANKDEBTit
þ3jLEVERAGEit
þ4jPRODUCTIVITYitþ5jRDit
þ6jSMALLitþ7jDIVERSIFICit
þ00i þ "00it ð3Þ
With TjðVÞ ¼ logðprobðV ¼ jÞ=1
P8
j¼1 probðV ¼ jÞÞ
00i accounts for the unobservable heterogeneity, and
"00i is a white-noise error term.
Interestingly, with this specification one allows for
a more flexible structure than that of the conditional
logit estimations presented above. With variable V,
one implicitly adopts the vision of a manager in a
firm that has changed its financial structure and has
to decide whether to hire long-term or short-term
workers. Moreover, the manager also negotiates
the length of financial contracts with lenders, and
takes into consideration the effect that this length
produces in the labour contracting (endogenous
relationship). Thus, to investigate whether the com-
binations (ILR¼ 1, IFR¼ 1) as well as (DELR¼ 1,
DEFR¼ 1) are more likely than alternatives in a
multiple choice setting, one should contemplate all
possible combinations of LR and FR. This is what
variable V does.
As a result of the previous specification, one can
compute the probability of different results for V (Pi¼
PROB(V¼ i) are denoted). This Pi allows one to
compute conditional probabilities of changes in
labour contract length contingent on changes in
financial contract length. In particular, Prob(ILR¼
1/IFR¼ 1)¼ P8/(P2þP4þP8); Prob(ILR¼ 1/
DEFR¼ 1)¼P7/(P1þP5þP7) and Prob(ILR¼ 1/
(IFR¼ 0 AND DEFR¼ 0)¼P6/(P0þP3þP6).
Concerning decreases in the financing ratio the
expressions are Prob(DELR¼ 1/DEFR¼ 1)¼
P5/(P1þP5þP7); Prob(DELR ¼ 1/IFR ¼ 1) ¼
P4/(P2 þ P4 þ P8); Prob(DELR¼ 1/(IFR¼ 0
AND DEFR¼ 0)¼P3/(P0þP3þP6). Finally, by
conducting a t-test over pairs of the previous probabil-
ities, one can test how important is the effect of
changes in the length of financial contracts on the
length of labour contracts.
It is worth emphasizing that by proceeding in that
way, conditional probabilities are computed making
use of the joint distribution of changes in financial
as well as labour contract length. This is a natural
way to incorporate in the estimations the existence
of an endogenous relationship between both contract
lengths.
IV. Data and Results
The data
To test empirically the theoretical contentions, the
database Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta
Sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEEE) is going to
be used for the period 1991 to 2000. This database is
updated annually by the Ministry of Science and
Technology, and it contains information of approxi-
mately 3431 firms within 18 manufacturing sectors.
This is an incomplete panel data of 28 029 observa-
tions and it is sensibly representative of the distribu-
tion of firms by employment and size. Table 2 shows
the evolution in the 1990s of the temporal labour ratio
(LR) as well as the financing ratio (FR) defined as the
ratio of short-term debt to total debt.
The data shows that the temporal labour ratio
was around 20% during the 1990s.9 Not surprisingly,
9One should say that these figures are higher than the figures shown in studies like Hernando and Tribo´ (2003), because the
database used is more balanced in terms of size of firms because it includes a higher proportion of small firms. Smaller firms
imply, according to Table 2, a higher temporal labour ratio.
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this ratio has shown a steady decrease since the
1997 Spanish labour reforms, to stimulate long-term
labour contracting, came into effect.
Table 2 also shows that firms’ debt financing ratios
have been decreasing continually since 1991, and
especially after 1997. Thus, one may expect the
existence of a link between the length of both types
of contracts, labour and financial. This is the main
theme of this article.
Finally, it is worth noting that in those years of
recession (1992), the labour ratio decreases signifi-
cantly. This can be explained because firms fire their
short-term workers during these periods.
Contingency analysis
As preliminary evidence, an analysis of the probabil-
ity to change the labour ratio is presented signifi-
cantly for those firms that had changed remarkably
their financing ratio. We also look at the control
variables from the basic specification (1).
Table 3 shows that those firms that have issued
short-term debt higher than the median for the sector
in a given year; hire more short-term and long-term
worker than the median for the sector that year. The
same is true for those other firms that have changed
significantly their financing structure by issuing more
long-term debt. Thus, at this level of analysis, one can
only appreciate some connection between changes in
firms’ financing structure and their labour structure,
but there is no direct relation between changes in the
length of these contracts. In addition, leverage, in
general, does stimulate the use of long-term as
well as short-term labour contracts; this is not fully
consistent with Hanka’s (1998) result.
Non-financial factors also have an impact on labour
policy. First, labour productivity is related to the pres-
ence of long-termworkers. Second, firms’ R&D efforts
seem to be accompanied with the hiring of more long-
term workers and/or short-term ones. In general, this
kind of investment is more productive when workers
have long-term contracts because in that case they are
more willing to invest in specific human capital as has
been argued previously. This is what will be found in
the following univariate analysis. However, one can
justify that R&D-intensive firms are generally small-
growth firms with a clear preference for flexibility.
This is linked to short-term labour contracts.
Finally, bigger firms adopt two alternative labour
policies: they hire a significant amount of long-term
workers or of short-term workers. However, the uni-
variate analysis that follows this result changes sub-
stantially as only small firms show a significant effect.
They hire short-term workers. This latter result is
going to be interpreted as a mechanism to be hedged
against demand or supply shocks.
Univariate estimations
As has been explained in the methodology section,
two types of estimations have been conducted. First,
one relies on conditional logit estimations over speci-
fication (1) in order to eliminate potential endogeneity
problems with the unobservable heterogeneity.
Thereafter, Tobit estimations are conducted to enrich
the results by using continuous, although truncated,
dependent variables. Table 1 shows the results. In the
logit estimations DELR (row 1) and ILR (row 4) are
the dependent variable, while in the Tobit estimations
RDELR (rows 2,3) and RILR (rows 5,6) are the
variables to be explained. Some estimations have
introduced variables D97RIFR and D97RDEFR
(rows 3,6) to check the relevance of the 1997 labour
reforms. D97RIFR is constructed as the product of
RIFR times a dummy variable (D97) that is equal to
one if the year is 1997 onwards, and zero otherwise.
However, D97RDEFR is the product of RDEFR
times D97.
Table 1 shows that a big increase in long-term debt
gives firms incentives to hire significantly more work-
ers with a long-length contract.10 Moreover, when
10This is true in the Tobit estimations but not strictly in the logit ones. In these latter estimations increases in the length of a
firm’s financial structure generate incentives to hire significantly more workers with any contract length. However, in the
next section, it will be seen that when controlling for additional endogeneity problems, increases in long-term debt
have a superior impact on increases in the length of labour contracts compared with the impact generated by increases in
short-term debt.
Table 2. Temporal labour ratio and financing ratio
Mean LRa
(%)
% of firms with
LR>0 (%)
Mean
FRb (%)
1991 23.73 79.12 70.37
1992 22.76 77.74 65.79
1993 22.68 80.21 58.61
1994 22.95 81.54 59.54
1995 21.53 82.51 53.96
1996 22.24 82.14 51.50
1997 21.89 82.06 50.23
1998 19.98 81.51 45.67
1999 19.42 81.12 42.41
2000 19.13 80.40 42.87
1991–2000 21.67 80.79 53.08
aThis is defined as the ratio of temporal workers to the total
number of firms’ employees.
bThis is defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total debt.
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firms increase their short-term debt, there is a signifi-
cant increase in short-term labour contracts. This
result is along the lines of what has been suggested
in the theoretical section.11 Note that this result is
rather predictable. If financial flexibility is high
enough (linked to long-term debt), firms can afford
to hire workers with a long-term contract. However,
when there is less financial slack (due to short-term
debt) only short-term labour contracts are available.
Thus, a firm’s decision to invest in human resources is
closely linked to the variations in its financial struc-
ture. This confirms the basic claim. A minor point is
that Hanka’s (1998) result about the existence of a
positive relationship between leverage and the hiring
of short-term workers may not be true when a firm
issues long-term debt. Moreover, the estimation
reflects that a firm’s overall leverage is not related
to significant variations in a firm’s temporal labour
ratio. The variation in the time schedule of a firm’s
leverage really affects the variations in the length the
labour contract.
Another result that links a firm’s financial structure
with its labour policy and provides interesting new
insights is that an increase in the financing cost
(DIFINCOST) generates lower incentives for a firm
to hire long-term workers. This may be interpreted in
different ways. First, long-term workers are more
costly to hire and a firm with higher financing costs
cannot afford those kinds of workers. A second inter-
pretation of this result relies on the inverse relation of
this variable with a project’s quality. The lower the
quality, the higher a firms financing costs. It has been
found consistent with the theoretical contentions,
that developing low-quality projects leads firms to
hire fewer long-term workers. Third, DIFINCOSTS
may be interpreted inversely as a proxy like
LTBANKDEBT of the financier’s commitment to
the firm. This eventually allows the development
of long-term projects. Both variables signal that
increases in that commitment stimulate firms to
hire permanent workers. This is consistent with our
theory. Finally, one can connect the DIFINCOSTS
variable with the degree of overall uncertainty and
risks. The higher the uncertainty and/or the risk,
the higher are a firm’s financing costs. Thus, one
can interpret the result found in terms of a reduc-
tion in labour contract length in periods of high
uncertainty.12
Interestingly, the aforementioned relationship of
a firms financing costs and its labour ratio suggests
the existence of a counter cycle financing effect on
the length of a firm’s labour contracts. By lowering
interest rates at the trough of a recession, the
Monetary Authority decreases the firm’s financing
costs. This generates, according to the results, an
increase in the firm’s labour contract length in times
of recession.13 The reverse is true at the onset of an
expansion.
Table 1 also shows (conditional logit estimations)
that small firms employ more workers with short-
length contracts than big firms.14 Small firms in
some sectors are the marginal producers. This
makes them quite sensible to demand shocks. By
using short-term contracts to hire workers, they
get some flexibility to deal efficiently with demand
variability. Along this line, Funke et al. (1998),
shows the relevance of a firm’s size effect in
explaining the link between financial contracts with
labour contracts. They find that in a small firm,
financing constraints are more relevant than they
are in a big firm. This, in turn, affects a firm’s labour
policy.
A firm’s productivity generates results in either
direction. On the one hand, one finds, consistent
with our theoretical contentions that the more
productive firms prefer to hire long-term workers.15
On the other hand, another type of productive firm is
more interested in the short-term labour contracts.
Along this line, Cun˜at (1999) proves, making use
of another Spanish database, that growth firms
11When one estimates RDELR with a fixed-effect regression (available upon request), one also finds a positive and significant
coefficient of RDEFR (0.019***), but not for RIFR. Similarly, in the estimation of RILR, the coefficients of RIFR (0.036***)
and of RDEFR (0.023***) are both significant and positive. Hausman tests also reveal the non-existence of fixed-effects on
RDEFR estimation. That is why we rely on Tobit estimations as dependent variables RDEFR and RIFR are totally
truncated.
12There is also another indirect interpretation. Those firms that have been able to reduce their financing costs (good firms) are
potential subjects of a takeover. Thus, they can hire long-term workers as a ‘poison pill’ to avoid to be taken over (Pagano and
Volpin, 2002).
13Note that it has been found in the descriptive analysis that in the recessive year of 1992, there was a significant decrease
in the temporal labour ratio. This is in accordance with our theory.
14This result also works when different variables like the log of sales are used.
15There is a relationship between a firm’s productivity with union power. The greater the negotiated power of the unions, the
lower firm’s productivity. They are also less likely to negotiate long-term contracts; preferring short-term labour contracts as a
way to ‘hold up’ workers with continuous negotiations. This allows the unions to maintain their bargaining power (Murphy,
1992). Thus, a direct connection is found between a firm’s productivity and a bias towards long-term labour contracting.
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(in principle, more productive) prefer short-term
debt. This is to avoid the underinvestment inefficiency
of the debt overhang problem. The central hypothesis
allows one to connect this feature with an increase in
the temporal labour ratio. This may explain the latter
result.
It is worth emphasizing the effect of RD as a sti-
mulus to contract workers with a long-term contract.
This is justified because R&D investments are com-
plementary to other types of investments like human
capital. This stimulates permanent workers to acquire
specific human capital. A second reason for this result
is that R&D-intensive projects tend to be long-term.16
A final comment refers to the effect of the 1997
labour reform. In that year, there were reductions
in payroll taxes ranging from 40 to 90% as well as
in dismissal costs for unfair dismissals by about 40%,
for those firms that hired workers from some special
groups17 with long-term contracts. To study the effect
of that reform, rows three and six show the results
of Tobit estimations that incorporate variables
D97RDEFR and D97RIFR. Interestingly, it can be
observed that after 1997, the financing effect on long-
length labour contracting is much more severe. In
particular, before 1997 those significant increases in
the long-term (short-term) debt had no effect (nega-
tive effect) on the significant hiring of workers with
long-term contracts. However, after 1997 the effect in
both cases is positive, especially for long-term debt
variations.
Endogeneity problems
The methodology section has explained that there is a
recognizable endogenous relationship between varia-
tions in the length of labour contracts and those in
the length of financial contracts. This may bias the
coefficients of the estimations. To overcome this
problem and check the robustness of the main results
of the paper, all the possible labour and financ-
ing scenarios are integrated in a unique dependent
variable, V. Then, a multinomial logit is estimated
of that variable, V, for the specification that incorpo-
rates all control variables used in the previous
univariate estimations. Results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that a significant decrease in a firm’s
labour ratio is more likely when there is a decrease
in the financing ratio (20.61%) as opposed to those
situations where there is no variation (13.58%)
or there is an increase in that ratio (17.51%). In
addition, all these differences are significant among
them. Moreover, there is a significant higher prob-
ability that a firm hires short-term workers when it
issues short-term debt (30.42%) than when it does
not make any debt issues (23.10%) or issues long-
term debt (29.50%). Thus, the positive relationship
between variations in the length of both types of con-
tracts, financial and labour, is fully confirmed once
one controls for endogeneity problems. This is the
main idea developed in the article.
V. Conclusions
This study has analysed the relationship between
variations in the length of labour contracts and of
financial contracts. Both contracts are channels
through which firms obtain financial or human
capital which are two basic resources of the firm.
To exploit the complementarities of such resources
better, contracts should share common characteris-
tics. The conjecture is that significant variations in
the length of financial contracts, because of raising
capital, are in direct relation with variations in the
length of labour contracts because of hiring new
workers. This statement is based on the commitment
effect linked to long-term financing that reinforces the
incentives of workers with long-term contracts to
make specific investments. Additional value is created
with these human capital investments, which makes
payment to debt holders more likely. This gives debt
holders incentives to offer long-term debt contracts
and, as a result, gives the entrepreneur incentives to
hire workers with long-term contracts. Thus, it seems
that a natural complementarity between changes in
the length of financial contracts and in the length
of labour contracts may exist. This recognizes the
existence of financing effects in any study of the
optimal length of labour contracts as a way to enrich
the traditional trade-off analysis between negotiation
16It may be argued that the connection between financial and labour contract length is spurious in a sense that an increase in a
firm’s growth expectations would make long-term financial and labour contracts more attractive. By incorporating the R&D
variable as a proxy of a firm’s growth expectations, the robustness of the main result in the paper has been proved. However,
an additional component potentially correlated with independent variables may exist in the error term. To treat this issue, one
needs to address endogeneiry issues more systematically. This is made in the following section.
17Workers under 30 years of age, workers over 45 years of age, the long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their
occupations and disabled workers.
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costs and uncertainty. This is the main contribution
of this study.
The empirical analysis uses a data set of Spanish
manufacturing firms for the period 1991–2000. The
results support the theoretical contention. Those
firms that have increased (decreased) significantly
their short-term financing ratio by raising capital
are more likely to increase (decrease) significantly
their temporal labour ratio by hiring new workers.
In addition, it is found that an increase in a firm’s
financing costs, which is a proxy for its deteriorating
quality, and/or low financier’s commitment to the
firm, as well as the overall uncertainty, is inversely
related to the hiring of long-term workers. Finally,
other factors have been found that shape the length
of labour contracts. First, labour productivity may
induce significant changes in the length of labour
contracts in both directions. Second, R&D invest-
ments induce a firm to hire workers with long-term
contracts to seek complementarities with human
capital investments that are more likely in long-term
workers. Third, it has been proved that the 1997
Spanish labour reform promoted long-term labour
contracting highlighting the relevance of the changes
in the length of financial contracts in either direction
as a way of giving firms incentives to hire permanent
workers.
Table 3. Contingency analysis
Frequencya
ILR¼ 1 ILR¼ 0 DELR¼ 1 DELR¼ 0
IFR¼ 1 (n¼ 1493) 28.90 71.10 16.45 84.55
IFR¼ 0 (n¼ 14802) 23.49 76.51 13.77 86.23
Pearsonb 46.41 (0) 17.17 (0)
DEFR¼ 1 (n¼ 324) 27.76 72.24 17.81 82.19
DEFR¼ 0 (n¼ 15971) 24.19 75.81 13.58 86.42
Pearsonb 17.44 (0) 37.00 (0)
DIFINCOST>medianc 25.27 74.73 15.77 84.23
DIFINCOST<¼medianc 26.28 73.72 15.97 84.03
Pearsonb 1.209 (0.271) 0.07 (0.791)
LTBANKDEBT> medianc 25.30 74.70 16.51 83.49
LTBANKDEBT<¼medianc 25.67 74.33 13.78 76.22
Pearsonb 0.219 (0.640) 17.261 (0)
LEVERAGE>medianc 25.74 74.26 15.36 84.64
LEVERAGE<¼medianc 24.44 75.56 14.10 85.90
Pearsonb 3.268 (0.072) 4.592 (0.032)
PRODUCTIVITY>medianc 24.80 75.20 14.87 85.13
PRODUCTIVITY<¼medianc 24.82 75.18 14.00 86.00
Pearsonb 0.008 (0.978) 2.337 (0.126)
RD> medianc 27.99 72.01 15.86 84.14
RD<¼medianc 23.19 76.81 13.64 86.36
Pearsonb 41.444 (0) 13.516 (0)
SMALL¼ 1 22.20 77.80 13.82 86.18
SMALL¼ 0 27.47 72.53 15.07 84.93
Pearsonb 56.862 (0) 4.831 (0.028)
DIVERSIFIC.>medianc 24.12 75.88 14.65 75.35
DIVERSIFIC.<¼medianc 25.39 74.61 14.23 75.77
Pearsonb 3.309 (0) 0.553 (0.457)
aFrequency expressed in percentages. Variables defined in the text.
bTest of Pearson (2). The null hypothesis is that both variables are statistically independents.
cMedian values for the corresponding sector and year.
Table 4. Conditional probabilities
Probabilitya
(ILR¼ 1)
Probabilityb
(DELR¼ 1)
conditioned to conditioned to
IFR¼ 1 30.42 17.51
IFR¼ 0 and DEFR¼ 0 23.10 13.58
P-valueb 187.60 (0) 82.52 (0)
DEFR¼ 1 29.50 20.61
DEFR¼ 0 and IFR¼ 0 23.10 13.58
P-valueb 109.81 (0) 158.20 (0)
IFR¼ 1 30.42 17.51
DEFR¼ 1 29.50 20.61
P-valueb 15.40 (0) 68.22 (0)
aIn percentage %. See the definition of the variables in the
text.
bt-test of significant differences in the probabilities.
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One of the outcomes of this article is to emphasize
the existence of a natural financing mechanism that
induces counter cycle movements in the labour con-
tract length. By lowering interest rates at the trough
of a recession, the Monetary Authority decreases the
firm’s financing costs. This should generate, accord-
ing to the results, an increase in the firm’s labour
contract length in times of recessions. The reverse is
true at the onset of an expansion.
Finally, a natural extension is described. This is
to examine other relationships between the char-
acteristics of financial contracts and those of labour
contracts. In particular, it is thought that the type of
retribution (fix versus variable) in labour contracts
is well connected with the characteristics of the ‘fix-
variable’ nature of financial contracts (debt versus
equity). To test this and other ideas will be the subject
of future research.
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